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Looking Beyond Sanctioned Names: AMLR and the Ownership-and-Control Challenge

Nov 19, 2026 Ph.D. Nezar Nassr

A company can look unremarkable on paper, with an ordinary trading name, a valid registration and no direct designation. If a sanctioned person owns or controls it, sanctions restrictions may apply.

For financial institutions, name screening is a starting point. They also need to understand the relationships behind the company, apply the relevant sanctions rules and keep their assessment current. The EU’s Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR) makes the corresponding customer due diligence obligations explicit. Instant payments add pressure to have reliable sanctions information in place before a payment begins.

This article explains why ownership and control need to be assessed separately and how customer investigations, researched datasets and transaction screening can work together to identify sanctions exposure beyond the names on official lists.

What are indirect sanctions?

Indirect sanctions, sometimes described as “sanctions by propagation”, are restrictions affecting an unlisted entity because of its ownership or control by a sanctioned person under the applicable sanctions regime. Restrictions apply to owned or controlled entities even when their names do not appear on the sanctions list (OFSI guidance).

For example, a company owned by a sanctioned individual may face ownership-based restrictions. A foreign bank that processes certain transactions for a sanctioned company may face secondary sanctions because of those activities, even though the bank has no ownership connection to that company. The applicable programme determines which activities trigger that exposure; not every dealing does.

Ownership-based restrictions and secondary-sanctions exposure therefore answer different questions: who stands behind the entity, and what activities has the person undertaken?

A payment to an unsanctioned recipient can still be prohibited if it channels funds to a sanctioned person. For example, a customer pays an independent agent who collects the money on behalf of a sanctioned company. The sanctioned company does not need to own or control the agent: the payment may still make funds available indirectly to that company.

Financial institutions therefore need to consider both who owns or controls the recipient and on whose behalf the recipient is receiving the payment. Checking ownership alone would miss this situation.

Indirect sanctions must be distinguished from secondary sanctions. Secondary sanctions, particularly under certain US sanctions programmes, can expose a foreign company or bank to penalties such as restrictions on access to the US financial system for specified dealings with sanctioned parties – even when the dealings take place outside the United States and involve no US persons.

Ownership and control are different tests

Ownership concerns interests held in an entity, directly or through other entities. Control concerns the ability to direct its affairs, including through voting rights, powers to appoint or remove directors, contractual arrangements or actual decision-making authority. A director or senior manager may exercise such control, but their position alone is not sufficient: the assessment must examine their powers under the applicable sanctions regime.

A shareholder register may help establish ownership. It may reveal little about who actually determines the company’s decisions.

The distinction matters because the principal jurisdictions apply different rules.

 

FrameworkOwnershipControl
European Union | Sanctions rules and AMLR due diligence

Regulation 269/2014, as amended: ownership means 50% or more of proprietary rights, or a majority interest; Commission guidance provides for aggregation.

 

AMLR Article 20(1)(d):

requires verification of ownership by sanctioned persons exceeding 50% , or a majority interest, individually or collectively. AMLR does not replace the applicable sanctions threshold.

Control is addressed independently of ownership. Relevant factors include board appointment powers, voting arrangements and dominant influence. A director or management title alone does not automatically establish control.
United States: OFAC 50 % RuleDirect or indirect ownership of 50% or more, in aggregate, by one or more sanctioned persons results in blocking.Control alone does not automatically block an entity under this rule. Other prohibitions or designation grounds may apply.
United KingdomMore than 50% of shares or voting rights. Separate designated persons’ holdings are not automatically aggregated; joint arrangements and other circumstances matter.Includes board appointment rights and the ability to ensure that an entity’s affairs are conducted in accordance with a designated person’s wishes.

 

These distinctions are grounded in OFAC guidance, the EU’s 2025 amendment, European Commission FAQs and OFSI guidance. The EU example should not be treated as a universal rule for every EU restriction: the applicable instrument must always be identified. AMLR requires checks for EU targeted financial sanctions across sanctions regimes. These include asset freezes and prohibitions on making funds or assets available to designated persons. The applicable sanctions regulation determines the precise restrictions and ownership or control rules; AMLR establishes the corresponding customer due diligence duties.

Even straightforward-looking chains can produce unexpected results. Under OFAC’s rule, if a sanctioned person owns 50% of Company A and Company A owns 50% of Company B, both companies are blocked. Multiplying the percentages to obtain a 25% economic interest in Company B would provide a wrong sanctions conclusion. Sanctions propagate through the qualifying ownership chain (OFAC FAQ 401).

AMLR makes the customer obligation explicit

AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, applies from 10 July 2027 and strengthens the explicit integration of targeted financial sanctions into customer due diligence.

This integration starts with understanding the customer structurally: Article 20(1)(b) requires institutions to identify beneficial owners and understand the customer’s ownership and control structure. Building on that understanding, Article 20(1)(d) requires verification of sanctions status and whether sanctioned natural or legal persons control a legal-entity customer or hold more than 50% of its proprietary rights or a majority interest, individually or collectively.

The obligation continues beyond the initial assessment: Article 26(4) requires regular reassessment, with financial institutions also checking upon new designations. To support this ongoing process, Articles 9 and 10 address sanctions non-implementation and evasion within controls and risk assessments.

Together, these provisions make the customer due diligence requirements explicit, but they do not create the underlying sanctions prohibitions or postpone existing duties. Nor does AMLR’s “more than 50%” wording override a sanctions instrument applying at exactly 50%.

The European Banking Authority (EBA) guidelines on restrictive measures, applicable from 30 December 2025, provide a further operational layer covering governance, policies, procedures and controls. Institutions should distinguish these supervisory expectations from the legislation establishing the prohibitions themselves.

The AML package also changes the information landscape

An important development sits in AMLR’s accompanying directive, Directive (EU) 2024/1640, commonly called AMLD6.

Article 10(9) requires central beneficial ownership registers to check whether their information concerns designated persons or entities. Registers must indicate situations where an entity or arrangement is itself sanctioned, is controlled by a sanctioned party, or has a sanctioned beneficial owner. The directive also strengthens information verification and discrepancy handling.

These measures should make registers more useful for sanctions investigations. They do not create a complete global list of indirectly sanctioned entities.

A sanctioned-beneficial-owner flag also requires interpretation. It can identify a relevant connection without establishing that the entity meets the applicable sanctions ownership or control test. Register information must be assessed alongside the legal rule and other available evidence.

Instant payments move more responsibility upstream

The Instant Payments Regulation (IPR) changes where certain sanctions checks occur. Article 5d of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012, inserted by Regulation (EU) 2024/886, requires relevant payment service providers to verify their payment service users at least daily and immediately after new or amended targeted financial restrictive measures enter into force. Within its defined scope, it prohibits additional payer/payee checks for those measures during instant-transfer execution. The compliance deadline was 9 January 2025.

The EU Commission addresses indirect sanctions expressly in Question 165 of its implementation guidance. It explains that daily customer screening can be configured to detect unlisted entities owned or controlled by listed persons. While the IPR does not harmonise the interpretation of ownership and control, the underlying sanctions rules remain relevant.

Question 165 also clarifies that Article 5d (2) does not exclude transaction screening against national competent authorities’ lists of entities owned or controlled by EU-designated persons. Question 166 permits checks of payment details concerning ownership or control of funds where daily customer screening cannot address those details (Commission clarification, Questions 165–166).

The practical implication is that screening customer names alone is insufficient where relevant ownership or control relationships have not been identified.

This makes accurate customer information particularly important. Repeated screening cannot reveal an ownership relationship that the institution has never identified or connected to its customer.

The regulation does not abolish all transaction-level sanctions controls. Other sanctions and AML obligations remain relevant. EBA’s explanatory material also addresses checks of payment details concerning ownership or control of funds that cannot be resolved through daily customer screening (EBA final report).

Why institutions struggle with ownership and control adaption

The problem combines legal interpretation, incomplete information and operational execution.

Ownership structures can cross multiple jurisdictions and contain intermediaries, trusts, nominees and different classes of rights. Control may depend on arrangements absent from public records. Designations, ownership and legal rules can change independently.

AML beneficial ownership identification and sanctions analysis also serve different purposes. A process designed to identify natural-person beneficial owners may overlook a sanctioned corporate shareholder or a relationship relevant to sanctions control.

These are documented supervisory concerns. In its May 2026 review, the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) reported difficulties identifying upstream ownership, interpreting control relationships and connecting counterparties to designated persons. It also identified vendor data omissions, delayed updates, screening gaps and weak oversight of outsourced arrangements.

The final challenge is implementation. Discovering a relationship is useful only if the finding reaches the systems and teams responsible for customer restrictions, payment decisions and reporting.

What ownership-and-control watchlists provide

Three types of information should be distinguished.

  1. Official sanctions lists identify designated persons and entities. They do not enumerate every company affected through ownership or control.
  2. Corporate relationship sources provide evidence from which an assessment can be made: company registers, beneficial ownership registers, securities filings, annual reports, shareholder agreements, customer documents, court records and credible investigations.
  3. Ownership-and-control watchlists turn research into entity profiles and relationships that institutions can search or screen. Their value lies in making previously researched relationships available at scale. However, inclusion criteria matter: some ownership and control lists include minority stakes and possible control relationships, extending beyond entities conclusively subject to blocking (LSEG, Dow Jones methodology)

A match against an ownership-and-control dataset signals a relationship that must be assessed under the applicable sanctions rules. Conversely, no match does not prove that an entity is free from sanctions restrictions. Institutions should combine screening results with customer due diligence and other available evidence.

Institutions should evaluate coverage, jurisdictional logic, research depth, evidence of control, update speed, identifiers and historical records. Purchasing data supports compliance; it does not transfer responsibility for the resulting decisions.

Customer screening: investigate and enrich

Customer screening provides an opportunity to investigate ownership and control before establishing a relationship and throughout its lifecycle.

A sound approach combines two complementary capabilities:

  1. KYB investigation: establish the customer’s structure, identify relevant owners and controllers, assess evidence and apply the appropriate sanctions rules.
  2. External intelligence: incorporate researched ownership-and-control watchlists to identify relationships or developments that customer documentation may not reveal.

The information should remain connected. If KYB identifies a parent company or controller, that relationship must be available for subsequent sanctions checks. If external research identifies a new concern, it should trigger reassessment of the customer.

Transaction screening: use researched data with targeted investigation

Transaction screening often involves parties with whom the institution has no direct relationship (counterparties). Reconstructing every counterparty’s ownership through external company sources during payment execution can be costly, slow and inconclusive.

Pre-researched ownership-and-control datasets make known relationships available for fast screening. They should operate alongside customer information, previous investigations and relevant payment details, with escalation where the circumstances require it.

From detection to effective compliance

An effective framework must also answer several questions beyond screening:

  • Jurisdiction: Which regimes apply to the institution, relationship and transaction?
  • Change: How are ownership and control developments detected between reviews?
  • Circumvention: Could funds benefit a sanctioned person through another arrangement?
  • Evidence: Can the institution reconstruct the sources, relationship and reasoning behind its decision?
  • Action: What freezing, blocking, rejection, licensing or reporting requirements follow?
  • Testing: Do controls detect missing relationships and stale information, as well as manage false positives?

Indirect sanctions expose the limits of treating watchlist screening as a comparison between two sets of names. Institutions need to understand relationships, interpret their legal consequences and act on changes. Customer due diligence, researched datasets and transaction controls each contribute to that work. Their effectiveness depends on how well they operate together.

 

This article provides general information and does not constitute legal advice. Sanctions requirements depend on the applicable jurisdiction and specific circumstances and may change over time. Readers should consult current official sources and obtain appropriate legal advice before making decisions.

About our Expert

Ph.D. Nezar Nassr

Ph.D. Nezar Nassr

Product Manager Payments, Compliance & Fraud Solutions | Risk & Fraud

With over 20 years of experience in banking and FinTech, Nezar is an expert in combating financial crime, employing a range of strategies from foundational models to advanced machine learning techniques. He holds a B.Sc. in Computer Engineering, a Master’s in Artificial Intelligence, and a PhD in Information Security from the University of Leuven. His work focuses on enhancing financial crime mitigation efforts and fostering collaboration between financial institutions and FinTech companies. Nezar is especially passionate about sharing insights from the RiskShield compliance suite and leveraging recent innovations from INFORM to advance financial crime detection and prevention.

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